Total Collapse: The Case Against Responsibility and Morality

ISBN-13: 9783319769493 / Angielski / Twarda / 2018 / 193 str.

Stephen Kershnar

Opis

This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous.

Spis treści

1 Introduction.- Part I; No Non-Consequentialist Morality.- 2 How Consent Works.- 3 Problems with Forfeiture.- 4 Against Proportionality: Proportionality is Not a Side-Constraint on Punishment.- 5 Rights Fail and Why This Explains the Other Failures.- Part II; Why There is no non-consequentialist morality.- 6 No responsibility (Responsibility and Foundationalism).- 7 If There Were Responsibility, It Wouldn’t Do Much Work (Responsibility and Internalism).- 8 No Responsibility No Morality.- 9 Responsibility Revisionists and Skeptics.- 10   Appendix One: What is Moral Responsibility?.- 11   Appendix Two: God is Not Morally Responsible. 

O autorze

Stephen Kershnar is a distinguished teaching professor in the philosophy department at the State University of New York at Fredonia and an attorney. He focuses on applied ethics and political philosophy. Kershnar has written over eighty articles and book chapters on such diverse topics as torture, affirmative action, reparations for slavery, pornography, hell, adult-child sex, discrimination, the most valuable player, capitalism, equal opportunity, slavery, sexual fantasies, and the nature of pleasure. He is the author of eight books, including Does the Pro-Life Worldview Make Sense? Abortion, Hell, and Violence Against Abortion Doctors (Routledge: New York, 2018), Adult-Child Sex: A Philosophical Defense (2015), Gratitude toward Veterans: A Philosophical Explanation of Why Americans Should Not Be Very Grateful to Veterans (2014), and For Torture: A Right-Based Defense (2012).

Blurb

This book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it.  Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, the author argues that our views on these matters are false. He presents a series of arguments that threaten to undermine our theoretical and practical worldviews. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous. It does violence to philosophical positions that many people took a lifetime to develop. Worse, it does violence to our everyday view of people. A host of concepts that we rely on daily (praiseworthy, blameworthy, desert, virtue, right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) fail to refer to any property in the world and are thus deeply mistaken. This book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and humanities professors as well as people interested in morality, law, religion, and public policy.