Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence Stability in South Asia

ISBN-13: 9783030213978 / Angielski / Twarda / 2019 / 134 str.

Devin T. Hagerty

Spis treści

Chapter 1 Introduction

The India-Pakistan Nuclear Arms Competition in 2019

The Political Context

Main Arguments and Chapter Plan

Chapter 2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016

The Kargil Conflict

The “Twin Peaks” Crisis

The 26/11 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks

The Uri Attack and Indian “Surgical Strikes”

Chapter 3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016

Nuclear Deterrence

U.S. Crisis Management

Poor Conventional Military Options

Strategic Restraint

Conclusion

Chapter 4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia Today

The Concept of Deterrence Stability

India-Pakistan Relations after the February 2019 Crisis

Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons: Capabilities, Doctrine, Command and Control

The Nature of “Ugly Stability” between India and Pakistan

The Theoretical Logic of South Asian Nuclear Deterrence

Conclusion:  Deterrence Stability in South Asia?

Chapter 5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability

Trends

Measures to Enhance Deterrence Stability

The U.S. Role

O autorze

Devin T. Hagerty is Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA.

Blurb

“This is a carefully argued, empirically sound and theoretically deft analysis of deterrence stability and its limits in South Asia. It provides appropriate details about the diplomatic and strategic postures of both India and Pakistan, and it discusses possible pathways for enhancing deterrence stability in the region.”

—Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA

 

“In this compact volume, Devin Hagerty provides a multi-layered account that is both theoretically informed and empirically grounded. It will be essential reading for students, scholars, and practitioners interested in understanding the South Asian security environment and deterrence more generally.”

—S. Paul Kapur, Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, USA

 

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

 

Devin T. Hagerty is Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA.