Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO Nuclear First-Use, 1945-1955

ISBN-13: 9781349531882 / Angielski / Miękka / 2005 / 329 str.

Andrew M. Johnston; A. Johnston

Opis

Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.

Recenzje

"There has never been a documented history of the origins of nuclear strategy. Never, that is, until now. Johnston's account of these events which helped shape the contemporary world order is both striking and persuasive. He writes better than a political scientist and thinks harder than a historian. A great achievement."

- Erik Ringmar, Department of Government, LSE

"Andrew Johnston has written an innovative work that challenges existing

interpretations of NATO's adoption of a first-use policy regarding

nuclear weapons. He brings an impressive intellect and subtle

understanding of the new theoretical literature combined with strong

archival research to increase understanding of a very significant

topic."

- Shane J. Maddock, Associate Professor of History, Stonehill College

"This is a seriously smart book. Sophisticated and subtle, Hegemony and Culture sets on their ears all previous interpretations of NATOs strategic posture during the 1950s. More than that, its cultural approach has far-reaching implications for how political scientists and historians of the Cold War think about their subjects and do their work. Thoroughly researched, deeply imaginative in its interpretation, and written with admirable clarity (and obvious enthusiasm), Hegemony and Culture is a theoretical tour de force and a major contribution to the literature of international history."

- Andrew J. Rotter, Professor of History, Colgate University and author of Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964

Spis treści

The Persistence of Nuclear First-Use in History and Theory Culture, Strategy, and Empire The Persistence of the Old Regime: British, French and American Strategic Culture before 1949 Disembodied Military Planning: The Political-Economy of Conventional Strategy, 1949-1950 Mind the Gap: The Myth of the Lisbon Force Goals, 1951-1952 Two and a Half Strategies of Peripheralism: France, Britain and the Eisenhower Administration Two Cultures of Massive Retaliation: Neo-Isolationism and the Idealism of John Foster Dulles Hegemony Versus Multilateralism: Nuclear Sharing and the Search for Cohesion in the New Look Our Plans May Not be Purely Defensive: Leading NATO into the Nuclear Era Conclusion: What Does Culture Tell Us About Nuclear Strategy That We Were Afraid To Ask?

O autorze

ANDREW JOHNSTON is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Western Ontario, Canada and Co-director of its Centre for American Studies.