Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics Revisited

ISBN-13: 9781138905795 / Angielski / Twarda / 2016 / 404 str.

Chennat Gopalakrishnan;¬Abar;¬Abar

Opis

This is the first attempt to bring together a careful selection of classic papers in natural resource economics along with reflections by highly regarded professionals about how these papers have impacted the field. The original commentaries by prominent scholars included in this book offer fresh thoughts and insights on the lasting impact of these papers, taking into account the many changes that have occurred in the discourse in economics, public policy, and social sciences in general since the original publication of each paper. This book was published as a series of symposia in the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.

Spis treści

Introduction  Section I: The Intertemporal Problem  1. Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions  2. The relevance and the limits of the Arrow-Lind Theorem  3. A reconsideration of Arrow-Lind: risk aversion, risk sharing, and agent choice  4. Evaluating uncertain public projects with rival and non-rival benefits  5. Probing the limits of risk-neutral government  6. Are we in this together? Risk bearing and collective action  7. Evaluation of public investments and individual discounting  8. Rebutting Arrow and Lind: why governments should use market rates for discounting  9. Revisiting Arrow-Lind: Managing Sovereign Disaster Risk  10. Size matters: capital market size and risk-return profiles  11. Microeconomic foundations of bailouts  Section II: Externalities and Market Failure – Ronald H. Coase  12. The Problem of Social Cost  13. Battles lost and wars won: reflections on ‘The Problem of Social Cost’  14. The importance of being misunderstood: the Coase theorem and the legacy of ‘The Problem of Social Cost’  15. Infringement as nuisance: intellectual property rights and The Problem of Social Cost  16. About some distortions in the interpretation of ‘the problem of social cost’  17. The successes and failures of Professor Coase  Section III: Property Rights, Institutions and Public Choice – Garrett J. Hardin and Elinor Ostrom  18. The Tragedy of the Commons  19. The Core Challenges of Moving Beyond Garrett Hardin  20. Revising the Commons Paradigm  21. Hardin’s Brilliant Tragedy and a Non-Sequitur Response  22. Free Parking at Christmas Is Not a Tragedy of the Commons  23. Guarding the Guardians: Enforcement in the Commons  24. From ‘Tragedy’ to Commons: How Hardin’s Mistake Might Save the World  25. Collective action and the evolution of social norms  26. The collective action theory path to contextual analysis  27. Contextualizing the influence of social norms, collective action on social-ecological systems  28. Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms: the principled optimism of Elinor Ostrom  29. Crossing disciplinary boundaries  30. Elinor Ostrom’s challenge for laboratory experiments  31. The evolution of social norms in conflict resolution  32. The evolution of elite and societal norms pertaining to the emergence of federal-tribal co-management of natural resources  Section IV: The Economics of Exhaustible Resources – Robert Solow and William Nordhaus  33. The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics  34. Reflections on Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics  35. What Does the Empirical Work Inspired by Solow’s The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics Tell Us?  36. What Would Solow Say?  37. Reflections on Solow’s 1974 Richard T. Ely Address  38. The Economics of Resources and the Economics of Climate  39. Celebrating Solow: Lessons from Natural Resource Economics for Environmental Policy  40. The Allocation of Energy Resources  41. Modeling long term energy futures after Nordhaus (1973)  42. The allocation of energy resources in the very long run  43. The world before climate change  44. Energy modeling post 1973  45. The allocation of energy conservation  46. A retrospective on The Allocation of Energy Resource  47. Backstop technology: model keystone or energy systems transition guide essay  48. Caveats for climate policy from Nordhaus’s The Allocation of Energy Resources  Section V: Renewable Resources - Paul A. Samuelson  49. Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society  50. Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society: Still an Important and Relevant Article Thirty Six Years Later  51. Reflections on Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society  52. Samuelson and 21^st Century Tropical Forest Economics  53. Putting Samuelson’s Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society into Context: The Limits of Forest Economics in Policy Debates  54. Samuelson on Forest Economics: An Inadvertent Tribute to Faustmann, and a Few Others  55. Thoughts on Paul Samuelson’s Classic, Economics of Forestry in an Evolving Society

O autorze

Chennat Gopalakrishnan is Professor (Emeritus) of Natural Resource Economics at the University of Hawaii, USA. He has published seven books and approximately 115 journal articles and technical papers on current and emerging issues in natural resource economics and policy. He is the Editor-In-Chief of the Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research.