Futile Diplomacy, Volume 4: Operation Alpha and the Failure of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1954-1956

ISBN-13: 9781138905252 / Angielski / Twarda / 2015 / 434 str.

Neil Caplan

Opis

This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed unsuccessfully at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict."

Spis treści

Part 1. The Background of Anglo-American Cooperation, 1948-54  1. Anglo-American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts  1.1. Dynamics of Anglo-American Cooperation  1.2. Support for Bilateral Negotiations  1.3. Support for United Nations Initiatives  2. The Two-Pronged Approach  2.1. 'A Gradual Process of Education' of the Arabs to Accept Israel  2.2. Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions  3. Nibbling at the Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management  3.1. The Tripartite Declaration  3.2. Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO  3.3. Anglo-American Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions  3.4. Starting a Chain of Confidence-Building Measures  3.5. From the 'Edges' Back to the Core Issues  4. Attempts at Conflict Resolution  4.1. Calls for a 'Positive Policy' – A Settlement by Compulsion?  4.2. American and British Plans for a Comprehensive Settlement  4.3. Convergence of British and American Thinking  Part 2. The Best Laid Plans  5. Preparing Alpha  5.1. British Good Offices Offered  5.2. Looking for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured  5.3. From Cooperation to Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms of Settlement  6. First Approaches  6.1. Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha  6.2. Setbacks: Baghdad Pact and Gaza Raid  6.3. Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir: Early Probings  6.4. London and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev Proposals  6.5. Factoring in Israel: Security Treaty versus Arab-Israeli Settlement  Part 3. Stumbling from Obstacle to Obstacle  7. From Secret Sounding to Public Pronouncements: The Dulles Statement, August 1955  7.1. The Dulles Statement, August 1955  7.2. The Waiting Game, April-August 1955  7.3. Dulles' Decision to Go Public  7.4. The Dulles Statement  7.5. Aftermath  8. Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection  8.1. Western Arms and Aid for the Arabs  8.2. Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the Tripartite Monopoly  8.3. Sharett's Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva  8.4. Fears of an Israeli Pre-emptive Strike  8.5. New Moves to Court Nasir  9. Eden's Guildhall Speech, November 1955  9.1. Guildhall Speech: Seeking a Compromise between 1947 and the Status Quo  9.2. Arab Reactions  9.3. The Israeli Reaction  9.4. Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position  10. Showdown with Sharett  10.1. Build-Up to a Confrontation between the US and Israel  10.2. Dulles' 'Bombshell Surprise', 21 November 1955  10.3. Not Another Munich: Israel Sets Out its Position  10.4. A New Israeli 'Peace Offensive'?  10.5. Finessing US-Israeli Differences  10.6. Between Optimism and Pessimism  11. Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection  11.1. Hesitations Regarding Israel's Arms Requests  11.2. Lake Kinneret Raid  11.3. Arms as Carrots for Negotiations  11.4. Arms and the Anderson Mission  11.5. A Brief Assessment  12. Alpha's Last Chance: The Anderson Mission  12.1. Preparing for American Mediation  12.2. Anderson's Mission: Mandate and Expectations  12.3. First Meetings in Cairo  12.4. First Meetings in Israel  12.5. Return to Cairo  12.6. Return to Jerusalem  12.7. Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem  Conclusions  13. Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems  13.1. 'Last Shot' at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion  13.2. Anderson's Final Visit  13.3. From 'Alpha' to 'Omega'  13.4. The Principal Players: Nasir and Israel  14. Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy  14.1. Militant Protagonists and International Opinion  14.2. The Context: British and American Interests  14.3. Carrots and Sticks: An Inventory  14.4. Anglo-American Cooperation  14.5. American and British Presumptions  14.6. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy  14.7. 'Arms and the Dam'  15. Documents

O autorze

Neil Caplan