Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

ISBN-13: 9781119530978 / Angielski / Miękka / 2022 / 560 str.

Max R. Bennett; P. M. S. Hacker

Spis treści

Foreword to the Second Edition by Denis Noble xviiForeword to the First Edition by Denis Noble xxAcknowledgements to the Second Edition xxiiiAcknowledgements to the First Edition xxivIntroduction to the First Edition 1Introduction to the Second Edition 8Part I Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical and Conceptual Roots 15Preliminaries to Part I 171 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Historical Roots 172 Philosophical Problems in Neuroscience: Their Conceptual Roots 201 The Growth of Neuroscientific Knowledge: The Integrative Action of the Nervous System 211.1 Aristotle, Galen and Nemesius: The Origins of the Ventricular Doctrine 221.2 Fernel and Descartes: The Demise of the Ventricular Doctrine 321.3 The Cortical Doctrine of Willis and Its Aftermath 381.4 The Concept of a Reflex: Bell, Magendie and Marshall Hall 411.5 Localizing Function in the Cortex: Broca, Fritsch and Hitzig 461.6 The Integrative Action of the Nervous System: Sherrington 481.6.1 The dependence of psychological capacities on the functioning of cortex: localization determined non-invasively by Ogawa and Sokolof 491.6.2 Caveats concerning the use of fMRI to determine the areas of cortex involved in supporting psychological powers 522 The Cortex and the Mind in the Work of Sherrington and His Protégés 562.1 Charles Sherrington: The Continuing Cartesian Impact 562.2 Edgar Adrian: Hesitant Cartesianism 602.3 John Eccles and the 'Liaison Brain' 622.4 Wilder Penfield and the 'Highest Brain Mechanism' 693 The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience 793.1 Mereological Confusions in Cognitive Neuroscience 79(Crick, Edelman, Blakemore, Young, Damasio, Frisby, Gregory, Marr, Johnson-Laird)3.2 Challenging the Consensus: The Brain Is Not the Subject of Psychological Attributes 81(Greenfield)3.3 Qualms Concerning Ascription of a Mereological Fallacy to Neuroscience 85(Ullman, Blakemore, Gregory, Dennett, Searle)3.4 Replies to Objections 87(Ullman, Crick, Young, Zeki, Milner, Squire and Kandel, Gregory, Marr, Frisby, Sperry and Gazzaniga, Blakemore, Searle, Dennett)4 An Overview of the Conceptual Field of Cognitive Neuroscience: Evidence, the Inner, Introspection, Privileged Access, Privacy and Subjectivity 944.1 On the Grounds for Ascribing Psychological Predicates to a Being 954.2 On the Grounds for Misascribing Psychological Predicates to an Inner Entity 99(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Searle, James, Libet, Humphrey, Blakemore, Crick)4.3 The Inner 103(Damasio)4.4 Introspection 104(Humphrey, Johnson-Laird, Weiskrantz)4.5 Privileged Access: Direct and Indirect 106(Blakemore)4.6 Privacy or Subjectivity 108(Searle)4.7 The Meaning of Psychological Predicates: How They Are Explained and Learned 1114.8 Of the Mind and Its Nature 117(Gazzaniga, Doty)Part II Human Faculties and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis 121Preliminaries to Part II 1231 Brain-Body Dualism 123(Searle)2 The Project 1253 The Category of the Psychological 1295 Sensation and Perception 1335.1 Sensation 133(Searle, Libet, Geldard and Sherrick)5.2 Perception 137(Crick)5.2.1 Perception as the causation of sensations: primary and secondary qualities 140(Kandel, Schwartz and Jessell, Rock)5.2.2 Perception as hypothesis formation: Helmholtz 146(Helmholtz, Gregory, Glynn, Young)5.2.3 Visual images and the binding problem 148(Sherrington, Damasio, Edelman, Crick, Kandel and Wurtz, Gray and Singer, Barlow)5.2.4 Perception as information processing: Marr' s theory of vision 154(Marr, Frisby, Crick, Ullman)6 The Cognitive Powers 1596.1 Knowledge and Its Kinship with Ability 1596.1.1 Ability and know-how 1626.1.2 Possessing knowledge and containing knowledge 163(LeDoux, Young, Zeki, Blakemore, Crick, Gazzaniga)6.2 Memory 166(Milner, Squire and Kandel)6.2.1 Declarative and non-declarative memory 168(Milner, Squire and Kandel)6.2.2 Storage, retention and memory traces 171(LeDoux, Squire and Kandel; Gazzaniga, Mangun and Ivry; James, Köhler, Glynn; Bennett, Gibson and Robinson; Damasio)7 The Cogitative Powers 1857.1 Belief 185(Crick)7.2 Thinking 1877.3 Imagination and Mental Images 193(Blakemore, Posner and Raichle, Shepard)7.3.1 The logical features of mental imagery 200(Galton, Richardson, Kosslyn and Ochsner, Finke, Luria, Shepard, Meudell, Betts, Marks, Shepard and Metzler, Cooper and Shepard, Posner and Raichle)8 Emotion 2128.1 Affections 212(Rolls, Damasio)8.2 The Emotions: A Preliminary Analytical Survey 2178.2.1 Neuroscientists' confusions 223(LeDoux, Barrett, Damasio, James)8.2.2 Analysis of the emotions 2329 Volition and Voluntary Movement 2399.1 Volition 2399.2 Libet' s Theory of Voluntary Movement and Its Progeny 244(Kornhuber and Deecke, Libet, Frith et al.; Fifel; Haggard; Filevich et al.; Frith et al.)9.3 Refutations and Clarifications 2479.4 Conflict-Monitoring and the Executive 251(Verbruggen and Logan; Botvinik, Braver, Barch, Carter and Cohen; Shenhav; Power and Petersen)9.5 Man and Machine: Doing Something Like an Automaton, Automatically, Mechanically, from Force of Habit 2569.6 Taking Stock 258Part III Consciousness and Contemporary Neuroscience: An Analysis 26310 Intransitive and Transitive Consciousness 26510.1 Consciousness and the Brain 265(Albright; Jessell; Kandel and Posner; Edelman and Tononi; Glynn; Greenfield; Lliná; Gazzaniga; Dehaene; Searle; Johnson-Laird; Chalmer; Frith and Rees; Dennett; Gregory; Crick and Koch; Glynn; Frisby; Boly)10.2 Intransitive Consciousness and Awareness 27010.2.1 Minimal states of consciousness or responsiveness 271(Giacin; Boly; Owen and Coleman; Nachev; Arat and Rosenkrantz; Searle; Dennett)10.3 Transitive Consciousness and Its Forms 278(Rosenthal)10.3.1 A partial analysis 28311 Conscious Experience, Mental States and Qualia, Neural Correlates of Consciousness 29211.1 Extending the Concept of Consciousness 292(Libet; Baar; Crick; Edelman; Tononi; Searle; Chalmers)11.2 Conscious Experience and Conscious Mental States(Rosenthal) 29411.2.1 Confusions regarding unconscious belief and unconscious activities of the brain 299(Searle; Baars; Chalmers; Glynn; Damasio; Edelman and Tononi)11.3 Qualia 301(Searle; Chalmers; Glynn; Damasio; Edelman and Tononi; Nagel; Dennett)11.3.1 'How it feels' to have an experience 304(Block; Searle; Edelman and Tononi; Chalmers)11.3.2 Of there being something which it is like ... 307(Nagel)11.3.3 The qualitative character of experience 31111.3.4 Thises and thuses 312(Chalmers; Crick)11.3.5 Of the communicability and describability of qualia 314(Nagel; Edelman; Glynn; Sperry)12 Neural Correlates of Consciousness, Integrated Information Theory, Global Workspace Theory 32212.1 The Integrated Information Theory of Tononi 322(Tononi, Boly, Massimini and Koch; Esser, Hill and Tononi; Siclari; Alkire, Hudetz and Tononi; Hyder, Rothman and Bennett; Casali; Ferrarelli)12.1.1 Axiomatizing Integrated Information Theory 326(Tononi)12.1.2 The ambiguity of 'information' 328(Tononi)12.1.3 Unclarities about experience again 329(Tononi)12.2 Global Workspace Theory 330(Baars, Dehaene)12.2.1 Analysis of Dehaene' s example 332(Mashour, Dehaene et al.; Lau; Kouider)12.2.2 On Dehaene' s misconceptions of consciousness and information processing 334(Dehaene; Shannon)12.3 On Finding One' s Way through a Conceptual Jungle with Worthless Tools 336(Crick and Koch; Bennett; Shannon and Weaver; Hubel and Wiesel; Chang and Tsao; Quiroga)12.4 What Is Necessary for Neural Correlation 338(Bennett, Hatton, Hermens and Lagopoulos; O'Keefe, Dostrovsky)12.5 Where to Find the Explanations 342(Schmidhuber)13 Puzzles about Consciousness 34513.1 A Budget of Puzzles 34513.2 On Reconciling Consciousness or Subjectivity with Our Conception of an Objective Reality 346(Searle; Chalmers; Dennett; Penrose)13.3 On the Question of How Physical Processes Can Give Rise to Conscious Experience 354(Huxley; Tyndall; Humphrey; Glynn; Edelman; Damasio; Bennett, Hatton, Hermens, Lagopoulos; Damasio)13.4 Of the Evolutionary Value of Consciousness 359(Chalmers; Barlow; Penrose; Humphrey; Searle)13.5 The Problem of Awareness 366(Johnson-Laird; Blakemore)13.6 Other Minds and Other Animals 367(Crick; Edelman; Weiskrantz; Baars; Frith)14 Self-Consciousness and Selves, Thought and Language 37314.1 Self-Consciousness and the Self 37314.2 Historical Stage Setting: Descartes, Locke, Hume and James 37414.3 Current Scientific and Neuroscientific Reflections on the Nature of Self-Consciousness 378(Baars; Damasio; Edelman; Humphrey; Blakemore; Johnson-Laird)14.4 The Illusion of a 'Self ' 381(Damasio, Humphrey, Blakemore)14.5 The Horizon of Thought, Will and Affection 38414.5.1 Thought and language 387(Damasio, Edelman and Tononi, Galton, Penrose)14.6 Self-Consciousness 390(Edelman,Penrose)15 Concepts, Thinking and Speaking 39615.1 Concepts and Concept Possession 396(Mashour, Roelfsema, Changeux and Dehaene; Zeithamova et al.; Bowman; Bruner, Goodnow and Austin; Rosch; Medin and Schaffer)15.1.1 Beginning again 399(Bowman and Zeithamova; Medin and Schaffer; Nosofsky)15.2 Concept Possession as Mastery of the Use of an Expression 404(Edelman and Tononi)15.3 What Do We Think In? 407(Einstein; Galton, Hadamard, Penrose)Part IV On Method 41316 Reductionism 41516.1 Ontological and Explanatory Reductionism 415(Crick, Blakemore)16.2 Reduction by Elimination 426(P. M. and P. S. Churchland)16.2.1 Are our ordinary psychological concepts theoretical? 427(P. M. Churchland)16.2.2 Are everyday generalizations about human psychology laws of a theory? 430(P. M. Churchland)16.2.3 Eliminating all that is human 432(P. M. and P. S. Churchland, Dawkins)16.2.4 Sawing off the branch on which one sits 43517 Methodological Reflections 43717.1 Linguistic Inertia and Conceptual Innovation 438(P. S. Churchland)17.2 The 'Poverty of English' Argument 445(Blakemore)17.3 From Nonsense to Sense: The Proper Description of the Results of Commissurotomy 447(Crick, Sperry, Gazzaniga, Wolford, Miller and Gazzaniga, Doty, Pinto, Volz)17.3.1 The case of blindsight: misdescription and illusory explanation 453(Weiskrantz; Beltramo and Scanziani)17.4 Philosophy and Neuroscience 456(Glynn, Edelman, Edelman and Tononi, Crick, Zeki)17.4.1 What philosophy can and what it cannot do 45917.4.2 What neuroscience can and what it cannot do 465(Crick, Edelman, Zeki)17.5 Why It Matters 468AppendicesAppendix 1 Daniel Dennett 4701 Dennett' s Methodology and Presuppositions 4712 The Intentional Stance 4763 Heterophenomenological Method 4834 Consciousness 487Appendix 2 John Searle 4921 Philosophy and Science 4932 Searle' s Philosophy of Mind 4993 Unified Field Theory 5044 The Traditional Mind-Body Problem 506Appendix 3 Further Replies to Critics 5101 The Mereological Principle 511(Burgos and Donahue; Dainton; van Buuren)2 Essentialism 515(Burgos and Donahue)3 A Priorism: Empirical Learning Theory or the Nature of Primitive Language-Games 516(Smith)4 Criteria and Constitutive Evidence 518(Smith)5 Foundationalism, Linguistic Conservatism, Conceptual Change, Connective Analysis, Tolerating Inconsistencies and Post-Modernism 519(Keestra and Cowley)Afterword to the Second Edition by Anthony Kenny 524Index 526

O autorze

M. R. Bennett AO is Emeritus Professor of Neuroscience and University Chair at the University of Sydney, Founding Director of the Brain and Mind Research Institute, and Chair of the Mind and Neuroscience-Thompson Institute. He is the author and co-author of numerous books, including The Idea of Consciousness, History of the Synapse, History of Cognitive Neuroscience, and Stress, Trauma and Synaptic Plasticity. He is past President of the International Society for Autonomic Neuroscience and of the Australian Neuroscience Society.P.M.S. Hacker is Emeritus Research Fellow at St John's College, Oxford, and holds an Honorary Professorship at University College, London at the Institute of Neurology. He is author and co-author of numerous books and articles on philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and is the leading authority on the philosophy of Wittgenstein. His works include Human Nature: The Categorial Framework, The Intellectual Powers, The Passions, The Moral Powers, and the landmark seven-volume Analytic Commentary on Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.