The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology

ISBN-13: 9781107004238 / Angielski / Twarda / 2012 / 294 str.

Kelly Becker (University of New Mexico); Northridge) Tim Black (California State University

Opis

The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts (objections that must be taken seriously even by those who defend enhanced versions of sensitivity) and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology.

Recenzje

'Becker and Black present state-of-the-art thinking about 'sensitivity', a principle typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge … strongly recommend[ed] … to anyone who has had an interest in studying the sensitivity principle in epistemology.' George Lăzăroiu, Review of Contemporary Philosophy

Spis treści

Preface; 1. The resilience of sensitivity Kelly Becker and Tim Black; Part I. Defenses, Applications, Explications: 2. Nozick's defense of closure Peter Baumann; 3. Sensitivity meets explanation: an improved counterfactual condition on knowledge Peter Murphy and Tim Black; 4. Sensitivity from others Sanford Goldberg; 5. Knowledge, cognitive dispositions and conditionals Lars Bo Gundersen; 6. Methods and how to individuate them Kelly Becker; Part II. Criticism: 7. Truth-tracking and the value of knowledge Jonathan Kvanvig; 8. The enduring trouble with tracking Jonathan Vogel; 9. What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief? Peter Klein; Part III. In Favor of Safety over Sensitivity: 10. In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology Duncan Pritchard; 11. Better safe than sensitive John Greco; 12. False negatives Steven Luper; Part IV. Sensitivity without Subjunctives: 13. Roush on knowledge: tracking redux Anthony Brueckner; 14. Sensitivity and closure Sherrilyn Roush.