Organization with Incomplete Information: Essays in Economic Analysis: A Tribute to Roy Radner

ISBN-13: 9780521553001 / Angielski / Twarda / 1998 / 358 str.

New York) Mukul Majumdar (Cornell University

Opis

This collection contains essays that provide definitive and accessible accounts of recent research on some of the most important topics in the theory of decision-making and organization-design with incomplete information. Aimed primarily at nonspecialists, some of the essays indicate the limitations of accepted paradigms and suggest directions of future research. Graduate students contemplating careers in economic theory will find the volume a particularly stimulating source of research topics. It can also serve as an item on the reading list of courses on advanced microeconomic theory, information theory, game theory and organization theory.

Spis treści

Introduction: searching for paradigms Mukul Majumdar; 1. Equilibrium with incomplete markets in a sequence economy Wayne Shafer; 2. The existence of rational expectations equilibrium: a retrospective Beth Allen and James S. Jordan; 3. Rational expectations and rational learning Lawrence E. Blume and David Easley; 4. Dynamic games in organizational theory Roy Radner; 5. The equilibrium existence problem in general Markovian games Prajit Dutta and Rangarajan Sundaram; 6. A practical person's guide to mechanism selection: some lesson from experimental economics Andrew Schotter; 7. Organizations with an endogenous number of information processing agents Timothy Van Zandt; 8. A modular network model of bounded rationality Kenneth R. Mount and Stanley Reiter.