40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1: Theory of Rent Seeking

ISBN-13: 9783642098055 / Angielski / Miękka / 2010 / 695 str.

Roger D. Congleton; Arye L. Hillman; Kai A. Konrad

Opis

The last survey of the rent-seeking literature took place more than a decade ago. Since that time a great deal of new research has been published in a wide variety of journals, covering a wide variety of topics. The scope of that research is such that very few researchers will be familiar with more than a small part of contemporary research, and very few libraries will be able to provide access to the full breadth of that research. This two-volume collection provides an extensive overview of 40 years of rent-seeking research. The volumes include the foundational papers, many of which have not been in print for two decades. They include recent game-theoretic analyses of rent-seeking contests and also appHcations of the rent-seeking concepts and methodology to economic regulation, international trade policy, economic history, poUtical com- petition, and other social phenomena. The new collection is more than twice as large as any previous collection and both updates and extends the earlier surveys. Volume I contains previously published research on the theory of rent-seeking contests, which is an important strand of contemporary game theory. Volume II contains previously pubHshed research that uses the theory of rent-seeking to an- alyze a broad range of public policy and social science topics. The editors spent more than a year assembling possible papers and, although the selections fill two large volumes, many more papers could have been included.

Spis treści

Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview.- Forty Years of Research on Rent Seeking: An Overview.- Rents.- The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft.- Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking.- Competitive Process, Competitive Waste, and Institutions.- Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and The Social Cost of Monopoly Power.- Efficient Rent Seeking.- Free entry and efficient rent seeking.- A general analysis of rent-seeking games.- Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations.- Dissipation of contestable rents by small numbers of contenders.- Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers.- The all-pay auction with complete information.- Rent Seeking with Bounded Rationality: An Analysis of the All-Pay Auction.- Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success.- Contest success functions.- On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games.- Collective Dimensions.- Commitees and rent-seeking effort.- Risk-averse rent seeking with shared rents.- Collective Rent Dissipation.- The equivalence of rent-seeking outcomes for competitive-share and strategic groups.- Public Goods, Rent Dissipation, And Candidate Competition.- Effort levels in contests.- Rent Seeking and The Provision of Public Goods.- A general model of rent seeking for public goods.- Collective Action and the Group Size Paradox.- Extensions.- Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking.- Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly.- Sabotage in Rent-Seeking Contests.- Strategic restraint in contests.- Strategic Behavior in Contests.- Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment.- The Social Cost of Rent Seeking When Victories are Potentially Transient and Losses Final.- Uncertain preassigned non-contestable and contestable rents.- Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation.- Information in conflicts.- Rent seeking with private values.- Structure of Contests.- Hierarchical Structure and The Social Costs of Bribes and Transfers.- Group competition for rents.- Bidding in hierarchies.- Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking.- Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests.- Maximum efforts in contests with asymmetric valuations.- Optimal Contests.- Competition over More Than One Prize.- The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests.- Incentive effects of second prizes.- Experiments.- Reexamining efficient rent-seeking in laboratory markets.- An experimental examination of rational rent-seeking.- Efficient rent-seeking in experiment.

O autorze

Prof. Dr. Kai A. Konrad ist Direktor am Max-Planck-Institut für Geistiges Eigentum, Wettbewerbs- und Steuerrecht in München. Er ist einer der forschungsstärksten deutschen Ökonomen und ein vielgefragter Berater in Medien und Politik, u.a. im Wissenschaftlichen Beirat beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen.

Blurb

The two-volume set 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking provides a new, extensive collection of significant academic research on rent seeking, from its beginning to the present. It includes a number of papers that have long been out of print and many other papers from journals that few libraries or scholars will own. Researchers in the field of rent seeking will find it useful to have this collection of texts as a reference manual. The introduction provides a thorough survey of the literature and summarizes the papers included in the two volumes.

The focus of Volume I is on conceptional and theoretical developments.