The Economics of Asymmetric Information

ISBN-13: 9780333647509 / Angielski / Miękka / 1997 / 208 str.

B Hillier

Opis

This book presents recent developments in the economics of asymmetric information. The problems of selection and moral hazard, with hidden actions or hidden information, are introduced by examining how they affect the market for investment finance. The ideas are then used to analyse the market for insurance, signalling and screening models of education, efficiency wages, industrial regulation, public procurement and auctions. Coverage is thorough while avoiding excessive mathematical detail. Diagrams and verbal reasoning make the ideas accessible to intermediate level undergraduate students and beyond.

Spis treści

Preface.- Introduction.- PART 1: INVESTMENT FINANCE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.- Asymmetric Information in the Market for Investment.- Finance Investment.- Finance and the Selection Problem.- Investment Finance and the Hidden Action.- Problem Investment Finance and the Costly State Verification Problem.- PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEMS IN THE INSURANCE MARKET.- Insurance and Risk Aversion.- Insurance and the Hidden Action Problem.- Insurance and the Selection Problem.- PART 3: THE LABOUR MARKET: EDUCATION, SIGNALLING, SCREENING AND EFFICIENCY WAGES.- The Selection Problem and Education.- The Hidden Action Problem and Efficiency Wages.- PART 4: REGULATION, PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND AUCTIONS.- Regulation and Procurement Auctions.